Louisiana terrorism case may move forward based on alleged violent attack on pro-Israel protest

From the decision of Judge Jane Triche Milazzo yesterday to Mann v. Koran (ED La.); remember that the factual assertions are simply those alleged in the complaint – there has not yet been an investigation into which version of the factual story is correct:

Plaintiff Dylan Mann, an undergraduate student at Tulane University, alleges that on October 26, 2023, he participated in a demonstration in support of Israel in uptown New Orleans, in response to a pre-planned anti-Israel demonstration. It alleges that the anti-Israel protest was organized by non-Tulane students and specifically targeted Tulane because of the significant number of Jewish students enrolled there.

The plaintiff alleges that during the protest, defendant Abraham Quraan was driving his vehicle back and forth between the two protests in order to cause trouble or provoke Tulane students. At one point, Defendant Quraan got out of his vehicle, violently assaulted the Complainant and tore an Israeli flag from the Complainant’s body. The accused Alaa Salam allegedly participated in the attack and hit the complainant with a bullhorn. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants verbally expressed their hatred toward Jewish people during the incident. After assaulting the plaintiff, the defendants allegedly continued to aggressively approach other Tulane students and Coran allegedly removed his belt with the intent of using it as a weapon.

The plaintiff also alleges that after the incident, the defendants used social media to “make implied threats of violence” against the Jewish people and the plaintiff personally….

Plaintiff files a charge of terrorism pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Section 2315.9, which provides:

In addition to general and special damages, the successful plaintiff shall also be awarded reasonable court costs and attorney’s fees in the appropriate district or appellate court upon proof that the injuries upon which the action is based were caused by an act of terror or terrorism resulting in injury to the person or damage to his property, whether or not the defendant was sued for his actions.

The article goes on to define “act of terror” or “terrorism” as, relevant here, “the intentional infliction of serious bodily harm on a human being” occurring “when the perpetrator intends to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, to influence the policy of a governmental unit by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a governmental unit by intimidation or coercion.” …

“A complaint may allege knowledge and intent generally, although it must always contain factual elements that make the complainant’s assertions plausible.” Although this Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint lacks detail, it must view the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and finds that he has alleged sufficient facts that his act of terrorism can survive this stage of the litigation.

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants’ actions were intended to intimidate or coerce Plaintiff and other Tulane students at the protest. It alleges that the defendants’ presence at the pro-Israel demonstration was intended to incite or provoke Tulane students. According to the complaint, the defendants violently attacked the plaintiff without warning and acted aggressively toward other students while spewing hatred toward Jewish people.

These actions could reasonably be seen as aimed at intimidating or threatening students, preventing them from protesting or supporting Israel, and curbing their freedom of expression and assembly. The Court notes that Article 2315.9 is broadly worded and that there is no case law interpreting its meaning. However, the alleged facts sufficiently allege that the accused acted with the intention of intimidating the civilian population….

Paul Sterbcow (Lewis, Kullman, Sterbcow & Abramson, LLC) represents the plaintiff.